reforms 1 , and the European Commission, in its Recommendations (2013:19) , sug gests that it is the labour market reforms that should be given greater importance within the 2013 Economic Programme for Croatia. It is a common perception among professionals but also the wider public that Croatia's labour market is in flexible and burdened by heavy hiring and dismissal costs.
Taking this into consideration, the author assesses different employment protec tion legislation indexes for Croatia before and after the adoption of Amendments to the Labour Act in June 2013, and analyses the flexibility of Croatian labour le gislation as compared to that in other countries. The paper assesses the OECD 2 
Index of Employment
Protection for regular open-ended contracts, including col lective dismissals (EPRC) and Index of Employment Protection for temporary contracts (EPT), based on an analysis of the Labour Act. Moreover, the Ease of Employment Index has been estimated, based on a data base published by the World Bank. 3 It has been estimated that the EPRC index for Croatia declined slightly, from 2.9 in 2008 to 2.7 in 2013, as a result of reforms in the area of collective dismissals. If only regular contracts are taken into account, this area of labour legislation has remained unchanged from 2008, which is in contrast with the reforms carried out in most other countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia), which decreased employment protection for regular contracts in the reference period. By contrast, due to a revision of Article 10 of the LA which go verns fixed term contracts, the Employment Protection Index for temporary con tracts dropped from 2.2 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2013, so that in 2013, Croatia's EPT was in line with the peer countries' average.
The assessment of the employment protection legislation indexes for Croatia was followed by their detailed analysis aimed at establishing which legal provisions resulted in labour market inflexibility even after the adoption of amendments to the LA. It was found that Croatia was more rigid than other countries in respect of employment protection for regular contracts, due to complicated hiring and di smissal procedures, according to which employment contract cannot be termina ted before the person is retrained and reassigned to another position, and in the case of termination of an employment contract, the employer is obliged to take into account the person's age and length of service. In the case of reemployment, priority rules for redundancies apply, i.e. where an employee is dismissed on bu siness grounds, the employer is not allowed to hire another employee for the same job for six months. Furthermore, the employer is required to notify not only the employee but also the workers' council of his/her intention to terminate an em 1 For more information, see the IMF website at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/HRV/index.htm; IMF Staff visit reports on Article IV Consultations, Croatia. 2 For more details, see: OECD (2013) and (2013a). 3 For more details, see: World Bank (2014). 142 ployment contract. These procedures are more rigid in Croatia than in other CEE countries.
In addition to the OECD EPRC and the EPT indexes, this article briefly analyses the World Bank's Ease of Employment Index which allows a comparison with a larger number of countries. It has been estimated that Croatia ranked 161 th on the ease of employment among 189 countries at the beginning of 2013, and 146 th after the adoption of Amendments to the LA in June 2013 (this estimations are based on the assumption that the labour legislation in all peer countries remained unchan ged during 2013). The findings of the Ease of Employment Index analysis also show that the Croatian labour market is extremely rigid compared to peer countri es, especially as concerns hiring and firing regulations. To the knowledge of the author, this is the first research work dealing with labour market flexibility which takes into account changes resulting from the Act on Amendments to the Labour Act in 2013 (OG 73/13). Furthermore, the article provides a detailed de scription of the OECD EPRC and EPT indexes, as well as the World Bank's Ease of Employment Index, used as indicators of the strictness of labour legislation, which is also a novelty in the relevant domestic literature. Therefore, this article features the latest and most comprehensive assessment of the available internatio nal labour market rigidity indexes.
employment protection legislation
The legal framework regulating the hiring, dismissal and other procedures related to the labour market is supposed to ensure timely adjustment of the labour market to fluctuations in the economic activity, while maintaining an adequate level of protection of employees (OECD, 2013) . 4 Given the variety of current legal sy stems and individual laws governing the labour market, the OECD used to assess and publish an Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL) which allowed a cross-country comparison of the labour legislation. The EPL index comprised a wide range of indicators that could be grouped into three main employment pro tection categories: regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismis sals. The overall index was calculated as the weighted average of these indicators. The relative significance of individual indicators was determined using a detailed methodology. 5 The overall EPL index could have values from 0 to 6, where a low employment protection legislation in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 139-172 (2014) 143 index value indicated flexible labour legislation, and vice versa. The index was assessed at a four-year interval for the previous four-year period, and was publi shed in the above-described form from 1985 to 2008. While the OECD published no EPL index for Croatia, its values were estimated at three occasions, suggesting extremely strict labour legislation. The EPL index for Croatia was first estimated in 2002, when it stood at 3.58 (Biondić, Crnić and Martinis, 2002) , and then in 2003, after the passing of the Act on Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 114/03), when it dropped to 2.76 (Matković and Biondić, 2003) , mainly due to the intro duction of legislation on temporary work agencies, the activities of which have not been previously regulated by law. Tonin (2009) estimated the EPL index for Croatia using the LA of 2004, i.e. its articles relevant for the determination of the EPL index which were the same as those used in the paper by Matković and Biondić (2003) . However, due to a slightly different interpretation of some arti cles, the obtained EPL value was slightly lower, 2.7. During 2008, the OECD modified its EPL index assessment methodology, by including three additional indicators. As a result, the index assessed on the basis of the LA (OG 149/2009) and the new methodology stood at 2.61 (CNB, 2013).
In July 2013, after a four-year break, the OECD published its updated information on employment protection legislation for the previous four-year period, based on a new approach regarding the assessment of individual indicators relevant for the evaluation of employment protection legislation. According to the new approach, the labour market legislations were primarily examined by OECD experts, while in the previous cases, data had been obtained by the competent national institu tions. This change resulted in the uniform interpretation of the relevant laws and application of the OECD methodology itself, which allowed a better crossco untry comparison of the labour market legislation. Due to changes in data col lection and the evaluation of indicators, the already published data for 2008 6 have been revised. Hence, it is worthy of note that the estimates for Croatia deviate from those based on the OECD methodology, since they were not made by OECD experts. Instead of this, the values of individual indicators for Croatia are author's estimates based on the relevant provisions of the Croatian LA and her interpreta tion of the OECD methodology.
Besides this methodological change, another novelty, crucial for the interpretation of employment protection legislation was introduced in 2013. While the availabi lity of underlying indicators for the assessment of the EPL index remained un changed from 2008, the EPL value was no more available and was not published. Instead, two summary indexes were considered alternatively: the index of em ployment protection for regular contracts, including collective dismissals (EPRC) and index of employment protection for temporary contracts (EPT). The new me thodology for calculating the two key summary employment protection indexes is presented in tables 1 and 2. Types of work for which temporary work agency (TWA) employment is legal (1/3) Restrictions on number of renewals (1/6) Maximum cumulated duration of TWA assignments (1/6) Does the set-up of a TWA require authorisation or reporting obligations (1/6) Do regulations ensure equal treatment of regular and agency workers at the user firm (1/6) According to OECD (2013), the main reason for non publishing of the overall EPL index is the fact that all implemented reforms do not have equal effects on the labour market, neither can these effects be unambiguously quantified and measu red. Therefore, introducing two alternative indexes should provide a better insight into the labour market flexibility. Thus, for example, the results of the flexibilisa tion of employment protection for temporary contracts will depend on the concur rent employment protection for regular contracts. Aoyagi and Ganelli (2013) de monstrate on a panel of OECD countries that a high level of employment protec tion for regular contracts combined with a low level of protection for temporary contracts results in labour market dualism. Literature offers many studies on ad verse aspects of dual labour markets. Khan (2010), for example, shows that dere gulation of temporary contracts increases the share of such contracts in total em ployment, yet without any major influence on the total number of employed per sons. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) came to the same conclusion, showing that the flexibilisation of the labour market "at the margin" (only for temporary forms of employment, such as fixed term contracts) initially results in higher overall em ployment, but this "honey moon effect" wears off eventually and regular emplo yees are replaced by those employed on temporary contracts. Furthermore, nume rous studies (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Blanchard, 2002) suggest that labour market dualism results in lower productivity, which, in the long run, reduces eco nomic growth rates. Dualism also has a strong effect on wage dynamics in the labour market. Boeri (2011) demonstrates that there is a wage premium for regular employment contracts, as opposed to temporary contracts. The premium ranges from 6.5% in England to a high of 45% in Sweden. 7 The substitution between temporary and regular employment can be avoided if the relative flexibility of both types of contracts is equal. Otherwise, dual markets will develop, with outstanding protection of persons employed on regular contracts and poor protection of those employed on temporary contracts, who will bear the full burden of a possible adjustment in the number of employees in times of crisis.
With all this said, in an environment of inflexible labour legislation, the flexibili sation of only the part of the legislation which governs temporary employment will have no major effect on the labour market, but it can lead to a decrease in the EPL value, which, in turn, can distort conclusions about the desirability of certain reforms for labour legislators. Therefore, the OECD has recommended that the EPL index, as an indicator of employment protection legislation be abandoned, and that the EPRC and EPT indexes be used, as they provide a parallel insight into the movements of employment protection legislation for both regular and tempo rary contracts.
Another motive for introducing the two alternative summary indexes which pro vide a better insight into the labour market flexibility is the fact that, during the recent crisis, many countries carried out labour legislation reforms in order to re move rigidities, improve their international scores and, consequently, become more attractive to investors. Therefore, such indexes make it easier to detect the areas of labour legislation which have been reformed.
Each of the indicators included in the assessment of summary EPRC and EPT indexes, as well as the summary indexes themselves, can take on a value between 0 and 6, where low-value indicators or indexes are assigned to countries with fle xible labour legislation, and high values of indicators/summary indexes suggest inflexible legislation 8 .
Using the relevant versions of the LA, the summary EPRC and EPT indexes for Croatia have been estimated, and the country's position has been analysed in rela tion to comparable countries and the main trading partners in 2008 and 2013, i.e. immediately before and after the outbreak of the crisis. CEE countries -new EU Member States with similar transition processes, in terms of institutional and eco nomic characteristics, were choosen as comparable countries for Croatia. Also included were Croatia's main trading partners, given that labour cost is one of the key determinants of cost competitiveness, and high level of employment protec tion results in high employer costs of hiring/dismissal. This implicitly increases labour cost and distorts a country's cost competitiveness relative to its trading partners. Moreover, given that most other observed countries implemented labour legislation reforms in the specified period, with a view to increasing labour market flexibility, the analysis was focused on the relative change in Croatia's position compared to the selected countries. 8 The OECD compiles and publishes 21 indicators and two aggregate indexes for the OECD members, as well as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Russia, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. 9 The main trading partners have been determined on the basis of direct import and export competitiveness and export competitiveness in third markets. The OECD publishes data for Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Latvia (post-communist EU Member States), as well as Italy, Austria and Germany (Croatia's main trading partners). As shown in chart 1, in the period immediately before the crisis, Croatian em ployment protection legislation for regular contracts, including collective dismis sals was stricter than that in other countries, with the EPRC index standing at 2.9 (the observed countries' average was 2.6 and the average for OECD countries 2.4). Accordingly, Croatia was among the most rigid countries in the observed group, along with Italy and Germany, while new EU Member States were much more flexible. Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/13) led to a change in the collective re dundancy procedure, which had a direct effect on the EPRC index because of a change in the indicator measuring additional delays in the start of the notice pe riod in the case of collective dismissals. According to the OECD methodology, where an additional delay in the notice period in the case of collective dismissals (respective to regular dismissals) is not possible, the relevant indicator takes on the value of 0. For possible delays of 25, 30, 50, 70 and 90 days, the relevant in dicators take on the values of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively. If the possible delay is longer than or equal to 90 days, the indicator takes on the value of 6. Since the public employment service was authorised to order an additional 3-month delay in the notice period in the case of collective dismissals, this indicator for Croatia took on the value of 6. Pursuant to Amendments to the LA (OG 73/13), the addi marina kunovac: employment protection legislation in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 139- 172 (2014) 148 tional delay in the notice period, to be determined by the public employment ser vice in exceptional cases, for all employees who are offered a redundancy pro gramme, has been reduced from 90 to 30 days. However, besides this additional delay of notice period decided by public employment service, pursuant to Article 112, paragraph (3) of the Act, an employer may not dismiss employees who have been offered a redundancy programme before the expiry of thirty days from the delivery of the programme to the competent public employment service. Thus, it can be concluded that the total additional delay period in the case of collective dismissals is 60 days. If the total delay period in the case of collective dismissals is compared with regular delays in the start of the notice period for regular em ployment contracts (10 days 10 ), the additional delay in the case of collective di smissals in 2013 was 50 days. With this delay period, the indicator reflecting ad ditional delays in the start of the notice period for collective dismissals had the value of 3. Owing to this change, the summary EPRC index dropped from 2.9 to 2.7. Other implemented amendments to the LA had no effect on the EPRC index. 10 According to the OECD methodology, the delay in the start of the notice period for regular employment contracts is 6 days, if it is necessary to, give a written warning prior to the employee prior to the dismissal, in the case of dismissal on grounds of employee conduct. An additional delay of 3 days is granted if the no tice of dismissal must be in writing. According to the LA, prior to a regular dismissal on grounds of employee conduct, the employer is obliged to warn the employee in writing of a possibility of dismissal. The notice of dismissal must be in a written form and it must include a written statement of reasons. The workers' council must be notified of the intention to dismiss an employee. Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia also increased the flexibility of their employment protection regulations for regular contracts, inclu ding collective dismissals in the said period, so that the average EPRC index for these countries stood at 2.5 in 2013 (2.3 for OECD countries). The relative posi tion of Croatia with respect to the EPRC value remained the same as in 2008. The reforming economies have addressed all areas of law governing regular contracts, facilitating the dismissal procedures, reducing notice periods and severance payments, but also redefining the terminology related to unfair dismissals.
chart 1 Summary Index of Employment Protection for regular contracts, including collective dismissals for Croatia and selected countries, 2008 and 2013
Since the EPRC index comprises the overall legal framework governing rights and obligations arising from regular contracts and those related to collective di smissals, the subindex of employment protection for regular contracts (EPR) and the subindex of employment protection against collective dismissals (EPC) can be analysed separately. This analysis shows a marked deterioration in the relative position of Croatia according to the EPR index in 2013 relative to 2008.
By separating the EPRC index into two subindexes (EPR and EPC), we find that through a recent reform, Croatia reduced the subindex of employment protection against collective dismissals from 3.75 in 2008 to 3.0 in 2013. The selected countries' average was 3.2 and was not significantly changed (see table 3 ). In contrast to the reforms of employment protection for regular contracts in Slova kia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy and Slovenia which have made this area of labour legislation more flexible, the reforms of legislation governing col lective dismissals in Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary have not brought any changes in collective dismissals. Moreover, collective dismissals in Estonia and Hungary have become relatively more inflexible as compared to regu lar terminations of employment contracts. Besides in Croatia, collective dismis sals became more flexible only in Italy and Slovakia. It is evident that collective dismissal regulations remained relative inflexible in all the countries, suggesting that there is a consensus that collective dismissals should be regulated more strictly, since mass redundancies can have extremely negative effects on commu nity welfare (OECD, 2013:86).
The subindex of employment protection for regular contracts for Croatia stood at 2.55 in 2008 and remained at that level in 2013, given that the 2013 reform brou ght no changes regarding regular contracts. The labour legislation reforms in most of the selected countries were mainly targeted at this area, and consisted primarily in facilitating hiring and dismissal procedures (Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary), as well as in significant shortening of notice periods and reductions in severance pays (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and Czech Republic). As a result, the subindex of employment protection for regular contracts for selected countries dropped from 2.4 in 2008 to 2.2 in early 2013, while the early-2013 average for OECD countries stood at 2.0. Slovenia, for example, reformed its Labour Act (Zakon o delovnih razmerjih), with a view to increase flexibility. Employee dismissal procedures were streamli ned, notice periods were shortened and severance pays in the case of unfair di smissal were cut. Estonia also reduced notice periods and severance pays and fa cilitated hiring and dismissal procedures. Moreover, Estoina made considerable changes in the "possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal" procedure. Consequently, the reinstatement of an employee in the case of unfair dismis sal is now subject to mutual consent of both the employer and employee (before the reform, the employee's reinstatement was subject to a court ruling).
Despite the reform, Croatia's employment protection legislation on regular con tracts still deviates sharply from the observed countries' average. Therefore, we will analyse in detail which indicators of the EPR index contribute to its high va lue. 
the score of 0). Where the employer is required to hand to an employee a di smissal with the statement of reasons in a written form, the indicator takes on the value of 2, and where it is required that the dismissal should be notified by the employer not only to the employee but also to a third party (e.g. the workers' council), the indicator takes on the value of 4. The notification procedures where the employer must obtain permission from a third person to make the dismissal valid are rated as the most inflexible (rating 6). According to the LA (OG 73/13), the notice of dismissal must be delivered to the employee in writing (Article 112), and the intention to cancel an employment contract must be notified to the wor kers' council (if any). The employer is required to consult with the council about the decision (Article 118). As a result of the above mentioned legal procedures, this indicator for Croatia took on the value of 4 in 2013.
Moreover, the indicator measuring flexibility in the definition of justified or unfair dismissal accounted for 10% of the total value of EPR subindex in 2013. If an employee's competence (dismissal on personal grounds) or the cessation of the need for certain jobs (dismissal on business grounds) are sufficient reasons for the termination of a regular employment contract, the index takes on the value of 0. It takes on the value of 2 if the termination of an employment contract requires from an employer to take into account the employee's age and length of service. The indicator is scored as 4 if an employment contract cannot be terminated before the employee is retrained and reassigned to another job, and the indicator stands at 6 if the law does not provide for dismissal on grounds of an employee's (in)compe tence. According to Article 107 of the LA (OG 73/13), dismissals on personal and business grounds are permitted only where the employer cannot reassign the em ployee to another job (retrain him/her for another job). When deciding on such dismissals, the employer must take into account the length of service, age, disabi lity and maintenance obligations of the employee. As a result of this, the indicator took on the value of 4 in 2013.
While dismissals on personal and business grounds are allowed in Croatia only in the above mentioned cases, in Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, a dismissal is considered as unfair only if it results from the discrimina tory treatment of employees (discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, trade union membership, etc.).
The indicator measuring the incidence of court rulings ordering the reinstatement of dismissed employees accounts for another 10% of the total EPR subindex va lue. This indicator takes on value 4, as in Biondić et al. (2002) , Matković and Biondić (2003) and Tonin (2009) . (The score of 0 is given to the labour legislation under which courts are not inclined to cancel a dismissal and reinstate an emplo yee to his/her former job, and the score of 6 to the legislation where such court rulings are exceptionally frequent.) 11 The more frequent the reinstatement of di smissed employees and cancelling of dismissals by courts, the higher the value of this indicator. Nevertheless, the amendments to the LA have no direct influence on this indicator, at least unless the judicial authority to reinstate employees to their former positions is abolished. In Estonia, for example, the reinstatement of an employee is subject to a mutual agreement between the employee and employer, but this is the only country among analized countries providing for such an option. In all other countries, the competent court may adjudicate that an employee should be reinstated in the case of unfair dismissal. The above mentioned three indicators together account for one third of the EPR subindex value, which leads to the con clusion that complex dismissal procedures and a broad interpretation of unfair dismissals are the sources of inflexibility of regular employment legislation in Croatia compared to other countries.
changes in employment protection for temporary contracts
In 2008, employment protection for temporary contracts in Croatia was around the average for comparable countries. The EPT index for Croatia and comparable countries was 2.2 (2.1 for OECD countries). 
chart 2 Summary Index of Employment Protection for temporary contracts for Croatia and comparable countries, 2008 and 2013

Sources: OECD (2013c) and author's estimate for Croatia.
11 Biondić, Crnić and Martinis (2002) indicate that the score assigned to Croatia is in line with the transition countries' average. A new assessment of this indicator is currently impossible, due to unavailability of public data on court judgements in labour disputes. As an approximate indicator, annual reports on the work of the State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Croatia (DORH) in the period from 2006 to 2012 have been analysed, showing that labour disputes decided in favour of employees account for 2/3 of total labour dispu tes involving the DORH, which is in line with the score assigned to Croatia. This analysis is incomplete, because it leaves out judgements in private sector disputes, and because it relates to all labour disputes, regard less of their types, but, due to a lack of other data, it is the only one possible. 
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The indicator measuring validity of the use of fixed term contracts accounts for the bulk of the value of this summary index for Croatia (45%). According to the LA (OG 149/09), an employment contract could be concluded for a definite period of time only in exceptional cases, when the end of employment relationship has been pre-determined for objective reasons, such as the meeting of a specific de adline, completion of a task or occurrence of a specific event (Article 10). Accor ding to the OECD methodology, fixed term contracts that are valid only if used for "objective reasons" are scored as the most inflexible (the score of 6). Where such contracts additionally involve exceptions on the part of either the employer or the employee which are allowed for concluding a fixed term contract, then the rele vant indicator is assigned the score of 4, and where exceptions are allowed simul taneously for both the employer and employee, the score is 2. Where there are no legal constraints on the conclusion of fixed term contracts, the indicator takes on the value of 0. Given that the Croatian LA provided for conclusion of fixed term contracts where this was justified by objective reasons, with an explicit exception for employees (first employment, employment of a probationer or trainee), regu lated by Article 37, paragraph (3) of the LA, this indicator for Croatia was assig ned the score of 4.
12
As a result of amendments to the LA from July 2013 (OG 73/13) relating to fixed term contracts, EPT index dropped from 2.2 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2013. This change was due to a reform of Article 10 on fixed-term employment. The first use of fixed term contracts was no more subject to time limits. However, in order to protect employees' rights, in the case of successive fixed term contracts, the maximum duration of contracts remained limited to three years. Moreover, restrictions with respect to reasons for the conclusion of the first fixed term contract were lifted, whereas the possibility of concluding successive fixed term contracts was only allowed if the employer had objective reasons for that which he had to clearly state in writing. Austria and Hungary also have no restrictions as to the objectivity of reasons for the first use of fixed term contracts (although this restriction does exist for each subsequent fixed term contract). Therefore, according to OECD re 12 It is noteworthy that this indicator for Croatia is scored as 6 in Tonin (2009), but it is assigned the score of 4 in Matković and Biondić (2003) . Moreover, during consultations with legal experts, opposing opinions were expressed, so that the value of this indicator, according to some interpretations, might be higher than 4. The effective assessment regarding fixed term contracts should be interpreted with caution, because, according to the OECD methodology, the weight assigned to this indicator is the highest, i.e. its value is the most signifi cant for the assessment of the total EPT index (the weight makes up 25% of the index). Equally ambi guous is the interpretation of the question regarding the maximum duration of employment via temporary work agen cies. Specifically, an assessment is made of the allowed maximum cumulative duration of employment thro ugh temporary work agencies. According to the LA, there is no limit in this respect, but there is a one-year limit on the allowed maximum cumulative duration of successive contracts. However, the term successive is not specified in the OECD methodology. In earlier studies by Matković and Biondić (2003) and Tonin (2009) , this indicator was assigned the score of 4, although Tonin (2009) notes that the required period of break after one year of employment through an agency (one month) can be considered as a relatively non-rigid limit imposed by legislators. Given that the weight assigned to this indicator is 8%, this question is not crucial for the assessment of the EPT index. Source: Author's estimates. 13 For more details on the regulation of fixed term contracts in Austria and Hungary, see OECD (2013b). In 2013, the indicator measuring the maximum number of successive fixed term contracts took on the value of 4 (0 before the reform). To be more specific, although the Croatian legislation does not envisage any maximum number of suc cessive fixed term contracts, according to the amended Article 10, an extension of the first temporary contract is only allowed if there are objective reasons for that. In addition, where the first employment contract is concluded for a period of more than 3 years, the employer cannot conclude the next consecutive fixed term con tract with the same employee (Article 10, paragraphs (2) and (4)). Based on a comparison with Austria and Hungary which apply similar solutions in the case of successive fixed term contracts, this indicator is assigned the score of 4.
Thanks to the reform of Article 10, this issue was brought into line with the EU practice, where the use of fixed term contracts is not conditioned by objective re asons, which makes it easier for employers to hire employees. However, in order to protect the rights of employees, such contracts are restricted by the maximum duration or maximum number of successive contracts.
In contrast to Croatia and Slovenia which reported falls in their EPT indexes, the value of the index increased in Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Germany, so that the average for selected countries stood at 2.2 in 2013. The growth in this index was primarily due to the harmonisation of the temporary work agencies' regulations with the applicable EU directives. However, through the flexibilisation of the first use of fixed term contracts, Croatian legislation be came more convergent with that of Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia which impose no "objective reasons" constraints on the use of fixed term contracts.
Another indicator having a significant influence on the value of the summary EPT index for Croatia in 2013 was the one relating to the regulation of temporary work agencies. This indicator measures equality of pay and other work conditions between persons employed through temporary work agencies and other workers performing the same jobs. According to the OECD methodology, where there is no legal obligation to give the temporary work agency employees the same tre atment as that given to other employees the indicator takes on the value of 0. Where the law prescribes equality with respect to pay or other work conditions, the indicator is scored as 3. Where it prescribes equality of pay and other work conditions, the score is 6. According to the LA (OG 73/13), the contracted salary and other work conditions for assigned workers in Croatia may not be lower or less favourable, than the pay and other work conditions for workers employed with the user at the same jobs (Article 26). However, as shown by a cross-country comparison, similar regulations were in force in most of the CEE countries, as well as in most OECD member countries. Hence, this indicator had the maximum value for as many as 23 countries in 2013. This is not surprising, given that all the In all other reforming countries, the difference in employment protection between the two types of contract has been reduced (chart 3), mainly through flexibilisation of regular (permanent) contracts. Consequently, increasing the flexibility of regu lar employment and reducing inequalities in employment protection between dif ferent types of employment remain as challenges for the second phase of the LA reform, announced for 2014.
At this point, it should be noted that a comparison between the EPRC and OECD EPT indexes makes it possible to analyse formal rigidity of the labour market, but not the effective one, which may depend on many factors, some of which are not determined by law. Thus, for example, regardless of the labour legislation, labour market rigidity largely depends on how this legislation is implemented by the competent institutions, since the rigidity of implementation may vary considera bly from country to country. Moreover, many aspects of the labour market regula tion remain outside the scope of the analysed indexes, e.g. the regulation of wor king hours which influences the flexibility of working time organisation, or the manner of conclusion and implementation of collective agreements, representing the main determinant of labour market rigidity in the peripheral countries of the eurozone. In this respect, the LA reform in 2013 led to reduction of minimum uninterrupted daily rest period from ten to eight hours, in order to better organise the work in agriculture, tourism and catering which, require split shift working time due to their specific nature. This change increased the flexibility of operation of enterprises, but is not reflected in the OECD indexes. Also, as a result of the Act on Amendments to the Act on Mediation in Employment and Rights during Unemployment (OG 153/13) passed in December 2013 the rights during unem ployment of persons employed in crafts, trades and free lancers, and private far mers became equal to those of employees with legal entities, which is again not shown in the OECD indexes. Hence, it is important to note that, due to their for mat, the OECD indexes provide only a general picture of labour market flexibility which also has some drawbacks. In addition, even those labour legislation aspects that are included in the index are not fully comparable. In Croatia, for example, the determinants of flexibility in the definition of unfair dismissal (priority rules for redundancies and the obligation to retrain or reassign an employee to another job) apply only if the employer has more than 20 employees. The structure of the OECD index is inappropriate to distinguish between the uses of these rules depen ding on the size of an enterprise. However, the effects on the labour market will not be the same if enterprises with 5, 10, 20, 50 or 200 employees are excluded. Therefore, absolute and uncritical interpretations of the EPRC and EPT indexes should be avoided.
ease of employment index
Another labour market flexibility indicator which is much wider in scope than the EPL index, and, given the availability of the data, can be estimated for most countries in the world, is the World Bank's Ease of Employment Index. Unlike the OECD indexes, this one measures strictness of a country's legislation related to working hours, but it does not analyse collective dismissals or the operation of temporary work agencies. Furthermore, the World Bank methodology assumes that an "average worker" representing a country earns an average wage, that his/ her religion and race are the average religion and race in the analysed country, that he/she works in the largest city in the country, in a manufacturing company with 60 employees which is exclusively in domestic ownership, and that he/she is not a member of any trade union. 15 In view of all this, as well as the fact that manufac turing in Croatia accounted for 15.6% of gross value added in 2013, it is evident that these assumptions undermine the representativeness of employees in the eco nomy. Hence, despite being based on a considerably larger sample of countries, which makes it more valuable than the OECD indexes, this index gives only a partial picture of labour market flexibility.
The Ease of Employment Index has been originally intended for measuring em ployer costs arising from labour legislation, whereas the utility of an employee arising from the employment protection legislation was neglected. Due to widespread criticism of this approach, the World Bank set up a working group to include a minimum level of workers' rights in the calculation of the index, in line with ILO standards. After the inclusion of a minimum level of workers' rights, if a country's labour legislation is too flexible to the detriment of workers, the country will be assigned unfavorable score. For example, a country's score will be lo wer if its labour legislation provides for an annual leave of less than 15 days, while countries the legislation of which does not provide for at least 1 day of weekly rest will be scored unfavourably for such over-flexibility. If a country's legislation does not provide for a minimum wage, the country cannot be assigned the best score on the indicator measuring the ratio of the minimum wage to the value added per employee, etc. 16 Despite the efforts to improve the index, the World Bank has not published the Employment Protection Legislation Index on its Internet site since 2011, but has published the data base pertaining to it, so that the index can be estimated. Howe ver, all the results obtained by the estimation of this index must be taken with extreme caution. 17 Having in mind the above mentioned shortcomings of this in dex, but also the extreme popularity of all the Doing Business indexes, below follows a brief analysis of the Ease of Employment Index. 18 The data are taken from the World Bank and there is no detailed analysis of individual legal provi sions, but only a commentary on the final results.
The Ease of Employment Index is calculated on the basis of two main indicators: the Rigidity of Employment Index and Firing Costs Index, where the Employment Rigidity Index is the average of three subindexes: the Difficulty of Hiring Index, Rigidity of Hours Index and Difficulty of Redundancy Index. Each of the subin dexes contains several components which are scored in accordance with the World Bank methodology, regardless of the characteristics of a given labour legislation. The components of the World Bank's Ease of Employment Index are presented in table 7. 16 For further information, see the World Bank Group (2013). 17 Moreover, in view of the previously mentioned non-publishing of the EPL index, another criticism of the Ease of Employment Index may be that its aggregate form does not allow to distinguish between the labour legislation providing only marginal flexibility from that where employment protection is equal for both regu lar and temporary forms of employment. 18 World Bank (2013). The World Bank data suggest that Croatia's labour market is rigid in comparison with the markets of other countries included in the analysis. It has been estimated that Croatia is rated the worst compared to peer countries and main trading partners (chart 4) holding the 161 st position among 189 observed countries.
Compared with peer countries, Croatia ranks the worst according to the Difficulty of Redundancy Index (dismissing one or more workers). This is due to the fact that Croatia has the largest number of restrictions on redundancy dismissals. Thus, marina kunovac: employment protection legislation in croatia financial theory and practice 38 (2) 139-172 (2014) for example, a third party (workers' council) must be notified of the intended di smissal of a redundant employee, the employer is required to reassign to or retrain a worker for another job before making the worker redundant, and priority rules for redundancies apply (depending on the worker's length of service, age, disabi lity and maintenance obligations), and for reemployment (in the case of a dismis sal on business grounds, the employer is obliged to offer the dismissed employee a new employment contract where a need for reemployment at the same job oc curs in the next six months from the dismissal). Croatia holds the second-last position among the observed countries in terms of the Difficulty of Hiring Index. Specifically, at the beginning of 2013, only in Cro atia, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia and Latvia fixed-term employees were prohibi ted from performing permanent tasks. The maximum cumulative duration of fi xed-term contracts was shorter than in Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Au stria, Italy, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, and the ratio of the minimum wage to the average value added per employee was higher than in all the observed countries except Slovenia and Italy. Although not significantly higher, this ratio ranks Croatia among lower-rated countries.
Redundancy costs (average notice period and severance pays for workers with 1.5, 5 and 10 years of tenure) are lower in Croatia (15 average week salaries) than in Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Germany and Lithuania, but considerably higher than the averages for Austria and Romania (2 and 4 week salaries respecti vely).
The relative rigidity of Croatian labour legislation in comparison with peer countries is also reflected in the Rigidity of Hours Index: according to the World Bank, there are restrictions on night and weekly holiday work (in the case of con tinuous work) in Croatia. Among the observed countries, only Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania rank worse than Croatia on this indicator. Given that the World Bank's database has been created in early 2013, it does not take account of the previously mentioned amendments to the LA. In the following, we therefore examine how these amendments were reflected in the Ease of Em ployment Index. In view of the design of implemented reforms and the construc tion of the World Bank indexes, only the flexibilisation of the use of fixed-term contracts, as the consequence of the LA amendments, affected the World Bank's Ease of Employment Index. Other changes in the LA related to areas not relevant to this index (such as the regulation of collective agreements).
Comparing the data for Croatia with Austria and Hungary, regarding the question: Are fixed-term employees prohibited from performing permanent tasks? showed that recorded answer in World Bank data set is "no", even though such persons are allowed to perform permanent tasks but only under the first contract, as is the case in Croatia after the adoption of Amendments to the LA. We therefore analyse the extent of change in the Ease of Employment Index as a result of this legislative change. However, we only make a direct assessment without including some indi rect effects. Thus, for example, an improvement in the index, resulting from a potentially more flexible application of fixed-term contracts may be partly offset, if their share in total employment increases due to the flexibility of this type of contracts, which may lead to a decline in productivity in the economy and, conse quently, to a rise in the Difficulty of Hiring and Ease of Employment Indexes. Taking into account only the direct effects, we estimate that, after the amendments to the LA, Croatia moved to the 146 th position in terms of the Ease of Employment Index. It should be borne in mind, of course, that the new ranking for Croatia assumed that no labour legislation reforms took place in other countries in 2013. If some other countries also flexibilised their labour legislation, the relative improvement in Croatia's ranking would be smaller. Other changes in the LA, implemented in the first phase of the reform had no effect on the Ease of Em ployment Index, because this index, unlike the OECD indexes, does not cover collective dismissals. However, even after the adoption of Amendments to the Labour Act, ranking ac cording to the Ease of Employment Index for Croatia remained relatively high (146). The continuously poor performance of the index is even more obvious if 
chart 6 Ease of Employment Index after Amendments to the Labour Act (OG 73/13)
. Croa tia's ranking on the Cost of Redundancies Index is also the most unfavourable (99), slightly more unfavourable than that of Macedonia (81). Interestingly, Ma cedonia belongs to the world's most flexible countries in terms of difficulty of hiring and redundancy. In 2010, this country reformed these procedures and in addition it increased the possibility of using fixed-term contracts. However, it is difficult to assess the labour market effects of these radical reforms in an economy with a pre-crisis unemployment rate amounting to 35%. Nevertheless, the unem ployment rate did not go up further and stood at 31% at end-2012. For details of the Ease of Employment Index for all the EU member States and countries in the region, see table A3.
conclusions
After the implementation of amendments to the LA, Croatia's employment pro tection legislation converged with that in peer countries and trading partners. As there was no significant further relaxation of employment protection for fixedterm contracts in the analized countries, the flexibilisation of Croatia's LA through expanding the valid use of fixed-term contracts has put the country closer to the already existing practices in the analized countries. On the other hand, the flexibi lisation of employment protection legislation for regular contracts, including col lective dismissals took place in almost all the observed countries. In Croatia, ho wever, except for the flexibilisation of employment protection legislation for col lective dismissals, nothing was done to adjust the employment protection legisla tion for regular contracts. Therefore, some of the hiring and dismissal procedures remain more complex in this country than in the observed countries. Moreover, as the reform failed to increase the flexibility of employment protection for regular contracts, it deepened the inequality of protection between different types of em ployment in Croatia. 19 In contrast to the OECD which analyses labour market rigidity only for the selected countries, the World Bank compiles the Ease of Employment Indexes for 189 countries, which allows a comparison with coun tries in the region. 
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Additional changes, to be introduced during 2014, are likely to bring further libe ralisation of the Croatian labour market and, consequently, more flexible em ployment protection legislation for regular contracts. As this article only deals with formal measures of labour market flexibility, it is worthy of note that the final labour market outcomes may be markedly different, especially in countries with high levels of grey economy and in times of economic crisis. Therefore, the ef fects of inflexible labour legislation on labour market outcomes remain a challenge for future research. 
